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“Pushing Their Necks Out”
Ultra, The Black Watch, and
Command Relations
May-sur-Orne, Normandy, 5 August 1944
David R. O’Keefe

I

n 1974 Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham
shocked the world when he revealed in his semiautobiographical work, The Ultra Secret, that the
Allies had been breaking high-grade German
ciphers throughout the greater portion of the
Second World War in an effort commonly referred
to as ULTRA.1 His disclosure sparked a tempest
as historians anticipated that his admission
would lead to a major revision of Second World
War historiography. At first, what promised to be
a new vista for historical research soon turned
into a quagmire. When the British Government
selectively released files pertaining to ULTRA,
only messages sent to commands in the field
were originally released whereas the supporting
documents necessary to properly assess and
interpret the impact of ULTRA in general, and
on Army Group, Army and Corps commanders
and their subordinates in the field in particular,
were retained. As a result, the reassessment of
this aspect of military history met a similar fate
to that of British armour at the foot of VerrièresBourgébus ridge during Operation Goodwood –
very good initial progress followed by confusion
and lack of consolidation resulting in the
perception that ULTRA was nothing more than
a highly overrated white elephant. Two decades
later, Government Communication Headquarters
(GCHQ) in the UK wisely reviewed their policy and
began a protracted release of millions of pages of
material to coincide with the 50th anniversary of
the end of the Second World War. Included were
materials that shed new light on the production
and dissemination of ULTRA (at Bletchley Park)
and its employment by the consumer, Allied High
Command, in the field.2 The releases have thus

far included everything from security regulations
for the handling of messages, to classified inhouse accounts of the impact of ULTRA on
commands, to high-level policy papers and
distribution lists to name but a few. In addition
to the ULTRA material, formerly classified
Intelligence summaries (produced at each
level of command from Eisenhower’s Supreme
Headquarters down to brigade level) were also
declassified during this period providing the
historian with two mutually supporting sources
to layer upon the existing corpus of material.3 As
a result, new insight and further understanding
can be achieved concerning intentions, orders,
decisions and operations that may have been
regarded, at that time or since, as peculiar,
questionable or ill-conceived. The impact of these
new releases on the historiography of Canada’s
role in the Second World War can be witnessed
in part by re-examining the costly and seemingly
questionable advance by the Black Watch (Royal
Highland Regiment) of Canada on May-sur-Orne
during the afternoon of 5 August 1944.
The first attempt by the Black Watch to bypass May-sur-Orne on the morning of 25 July
during Operation Spring ended in disaster as
300 of 315 men were lost attempting to capture
the town of Fontenay-le-Marmion on the reverse
slope of Verrières Ridge. In fact, during their first
week of fighting in Normandy, the 1st Battalion
of the Black Watch sustained heavy casualties
that included one commanding officer, his battle
adjutant, all the rifle company commanders, their
second-in-commands and the majority of senior
NCOs.4 When Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Mitchell
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Senior officers of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada: Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Michell (left photographed as a major) took command of the battalion following its destruction on 25 July 1944 during the advance
up Verrières Ridge. Major Tom Anyon (centre) assumed command of “A” Company while Major Ronnie Bennett took
over “D” Company. On 5 August Mitchell emerged from the second battle of May-sur-Orne unscathed but Anyon and
Bennett were both killed. (Black Watch Archives)

took command of the remnants of the battalion
the day after Spring, only two of the six remaining
officers had any battle experience.5 This was
further reduced when Lieutenant George Buch
was wounded a few hours after Mitchell arrived,
leaving only Captain Ronnie Bennett as the lone
senior Black Watch officer to see combat.6 As a
result, Mitchell faced the task of rebuilding and
retraining four Black Watch rifle companies that
suffered 95 percent casualties on 25 July, and
restoring the confidence of a well-trained but
inexperienced infantry battalion.7 According to
Brigaider W.J. “Bill” Megill, commander of 5th
Canadian Infantry Brigade, a battalion operating
under normal circumstances could suffer 10
percent casualties per month and keep fighting,
20 percent casualties would require one month
of re-training while 30 percent a full two months,
and so on.8 Despite assurances that the Black
Watch would be afforded the necessary time to
absorb reinforcements and retrain, the afternoon
of 5 August witnessed the newly re-composed rifle
companies advancing down the road to May-surOrne, a mere ten days after being destroyed in
the fields east of the village.
Originally, Megill planned to ease Mitchell’s
battalion into the line south of the twin towns
of St. André and St. Martin in a series of small-

scale defensive actions with the dual purpose of
strengthening unit cohesion and acclimatizing
reinforcements to life in the Normandy
bridgehead. It was here that reinforcements
(some with only 6-8 weeks of total service) came
under shell and sniper fire for the first time.9 The
first of these actions occurred during the night of
4-5 August when the Black Watch relieved units of
the Fusilier Mont-Royal in the St. André-St.Martin
area and conducted routine patrolling in the area
south of the village.10 At 1030 hours, however, the
routine nature of the day was interrupted when a
Liaison Officer (LO) from Major-General Charles
Foulkes’ 2nd Canadian Infantry Division brought
instructions for 5th Brigade to prevent any enemy
withdrawal or movement from their front.11 The
abrupt change of plans stemmed from confirmed
reports that German units facing the British 53rd
Infantry Division west of the Orne River had
withdrawn, leaving Foulkes to wonder if the same
had occurred on his front.12 Patrols conducted
during the night did not support this however, and
Foulkes was informed by his LO that the “enemy
was still on 5th Brigade’s front.”13 Undaunted,
a second LO arrived at Megill’s headquarters
roughly 90 minutes later bringing orders from
Foulkes to commence “active probing” and follow
up any sign of enemy withdrawal.14 In response,
Megill drew up a patrol programme that called
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for the Black Watch to launch a company-sized
fighting patrol to to capture the “chateau” area
southwest of St. André. If opposition proved
slight, a second company would pass through
to the area northeast of May-sur-Orne and probe
the outskirts of town.15 Finally, at last light, a
reconnaissance patrol would move south from St.
Martin to reconnoitre the “factory” and if lightly
held, a fighting patrol would occupy the structure
and its environs. 16
The leading patrols were about to sortie
when Foulkes arrived in person at Black Watch
headquarters just after 1400 hours and informed
both Mitchell and Megill that the “enemy (was)
withdrawing his depleted forces” and that the
Black Watch “MUST keep contact” and “hold”
the enemy in place so that “a larger plan may be
successfully accomplished.”17 As a result, the
limited unit-size patrol programme was set aside

and a bolder Brigade-level operation adopted.
In the new three-phased plan, Mitchell’s
battalion would advance down the St. André/
May-sur-Orne road and capture May-sur-Orne in
phase I, followed by the Régiment de Maisonneuve
who would pass through and assault Fontenayle-Marmion in phase II. If this proved successful,
the Calgary Highlanders would move through
Fontenay-le-Marmion and advance, if possible,
as far as Bretteville-sur-Laize in the final phase.18
Support for the Black Watch consisted of artillery
“on call,” but tank, anti-tank and heavy machine
gun support was not allocated for their phase
of the advance. It is unclear whether Foulkes
withheld all but artillery support due to the
lack of available armour, or whether he chose to
reserve it for it for the later phases.19 Either way,
the Black Watch would advance to May-sur-Orne
without the benefit of direct fire support.

A Canadian soldier walks through the ruins of May-sur-Orne, 9 August 1944.
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Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) PMR 90-412

With little additional information other than
patrol reports from the previous night, Mitchell
was wary of the optimistic portrait painted by
Foulkes and now parroted by Megill.20 Since
the debacle on 25 July, a growing acrimony
between the Black Watch and their superiors
had developed as each were blamed (to varying
degrees) for the fate of the battalion in Spring.21
Futhermore, the consensus opinion within the
battalion viewed both the Brigade and Division
commanders as “funnels” for orders from higher
command with neither displaying the tactical
acumen, or intestinal fortitude, necessary to
bring about less than costly results.22 Together,
their less than convincing justification for the
hasty change of plan on 5 August did little to
dissipate the increasing non-confidence. Despite
his reservations concerning the seemingly overlyoptimistic picture faced by his battalion, Mitchell
reluctantly placed his faith in providence and
higher command and ordered the Black Watch
to cautiously advance along the one kilometre
stretch of road leading to May-sur-Orne.
Just after 1600 hours, the battalion started
up the road to May-sur-Orne with Major Tom
Anyon’s “A” Company in the lead. Following
Anyon were Major Ronnie Bennett’s “D” Company
with “B” and “C” Companies and Mitchell’s
headquarters bringing up the rear on the flanks.23
Mitchell elected to send only 50 men up with
Anyon in “A” Company, while the rest of his
“unborn but gallant little company” remained left
out of battle due to their relative inexperience.24
Twenty minutes after departing, Mitchell reported
that the battalion had “encountered no enemy
at (the) chateau” and that he was pressing on to
May-sur-Orne.25 Moving in single file down both
sides of the road at five-yard intervals, the men
of the Black Watch moved past the bloated and
decaying bodies of unburied Canadians who fell
in combat over the previous fortnight.26 It was
a “disturbing sight,” which “unnerved” some in
the lead companies, but the advance continued
without incident until the lead companies
reached the ruins of the northern outskirts of
May-sur-Orne.27
Opposite: This photograph is taken from the northern
edge of May-sur-Orne. The mine tower in the “factory”
area is visible at the top left as is the church in St. Martinde-Fontenay (top right). This is essentially the ground
covered by the Black Watch as they approached May on
the morning of 5 August 1944.

From German positions in and around
the town the advance of the Black Watch down
the main road looked surreal. A veteran of 1st
SS Panzer Division, Obersturmfuhrer Preus,
boasted that he could “scarcely believe (his) eyes”
when he saw the lead companies advancing in
plain view of the German guns:
Their forces were in a picture-book formation
such as I had never seen in all my years of war.
One company marched in two rows in close
formation on the left and right of the road. The
Company Commander was in front, right in the
middle of the road…It was simply incredible!28

According to doctrine, Preus’ men held their
fire and watched intently as the Black Watch
cautiously made their way towards May-surOrne following an Allied artillery barrage that
landed in and around the town. When the lead
companies entered the northern outskirts of
May-sur-Orne, the artillery support lifted early
leaving the men exposed as they crossed final
100 yards. According to Preus, this presented a
target that, “was enough to warm our hearts,”29
and it was here that the 1st SS “snapped the
trap shut.”30 As the Black Watch war diary noted,
“not a mortar or 88 had landed within miles”
until that point when the Germans opened up
“plastering the lead companies with both, as fast
as he could load.”31 Both “A” and “D” Companies
were immediately pinned down in the ditches
on either side of the road with Anyon and one of
his platoon commanders being the first to fall in
what proved to be a costly afternoon.32 Without
the benefit of anti-tank guns or tank support,
“A” Company found itself in a dire predicament
when a German tank “advanced down the
center of the road,” firing high explosive shells
and machine gunning the men in the ditches
either killing or forcing the remainder of “A”
Company to surrender.33 “D” Company was also
hit hard and forced to withdraw towards St.
André-sur-Orne. “B” and “C” Companies, upon
viewing the slaughter up ahead, desperately
pleaded in vain with 5th Brigade Headquarters
for tank support.34 Lacking a positive response
from Megill’s headquarters Mitchell personally
intervened at 1820 hours and assured 5th
Brigade that his companies had indeed “asked
for (a) reason.”35 It is unclear whether tank
support did indeed arrive, but either way, “B” and
“C” Companies adopted holding positions that
straddled the road to May-sur-Orne where they
37
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Major-General Charles Foulkes (left), commander of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and Brigadier Bill Megill (right),
commander of 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade were seen as merely “funnelling” orders from high command and as a
result Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, commanding officer of the Black Watch, lost confidence in his immediate commanders.

remained for the next few days.36 German shelling
also took its toll on Mitchell’s headquarters
during their advance behind the lead companies.
Despite being “constantly where the going was
the toughest,” Mitchell survived the advance
without a scratch, but others accompanying the
Black Watch CO were not so lucky.37 Mitchell’s
signaller, Corporal S. Smith, was killed by
shrapnel as he stood next to him while mortar
shells severely wounded the Battalion Intelligence
officer, Lieutenant P. Mackenzie, and took the
life of “D” Company commander Captain R.E.
Bennett – the sole remaining Black Watch officer
with combat experience.38 As the Black Watch
war diarist noted, the afternoon took not only a
heavy physical toll on its participants, but also
affected the nerves of many of those who were
experiencing battle for the first time. “Some of
the new lads whom we have recently received as
replacements are taking this action quite hard,
for most of them are fresh from Canada.”39
The costly failure of the operation, coupled
with its haphazard and seemingly ill-conceived
nature, served to exacerbate an already tense
relationship between Mitchell and Megill.40 In
addition, as no explanation or appreciation
of the motives that prompted the attack on 5
August had been available until now, a generation
of historians has pointed to this attack as an

illustration of the ineptitude of Canadian High
Command.41 Fortunately, the recent release of
classified intelligence material sheds new light
on the origins of the operation and in particular,
the hasty manner in which it was carried out.
Between 27 July and 5 August, events in
the Normandy bridgehead evolved at a rapid
pace. During this period it became apparent to
Allied High Command that American forces in
the area of St. Lô had achieved a breakout in
Operation Cobra, and as a result, the complexion
of the Normandy campaign changed from static
to fluid on the western end of the bridgehead.
Unfortunately for Canadian troops to the east,
their earlier attempts to punch a hole in the
German line south of Caen had attracted the
bulk of the German armour reserves to Verrières
Ridge and forced 21st Army Group commander
General Bernard Law Montgomery to modify his
strategy. Realizing that the armoured weight of the
German defence was too strong along Verrières,
Montgomery decided late on the evening on
26 July to pin or “fix” the bulk of the German
Panzer reserves on the ridge.42 As a result, units
of the 2nd Canadian Corps were tasked with the
unenviable role of “holding” the panzers in place.
While the Black Watch hurriedly reformed
its depleted ranks, its sister battalions in the 5th
39

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Canadian Infantry Brigade were committed to
the holding operation south of Caen by way of a
series of limited battalion-sized probing attacks
around the towns of Tilly-la-Campagne and Maysur-Orne.43 Despite the valiant, and at times
desperate, efforts of the troops in these assaults,
the fact remained that the Canadian holding
attacks along Verrières Ridge did not succeed.
From 27 July until 5 August, German High
Command extricated all of its panzer divisions
from the Canadian front in an effort to plug holes
in front of the surging American and British
armies. Allied High Command was painfully
aware of this situation as ULTRA revealed that the
2nd, 21st and 116th Panzer, along with the 9th
and 10th SS Divisions, had already moved west
of the Orne River by the night of 4-5 August.44 In
addition, there were strong indications that 1st
and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were pulling out
too, headed either into reserve positions around
Bretteville-sur-Laize or across the Orne River to
face the British or Americans.45 Neither scenario
was in the prescribed plans, and Montgomery
put pressure on First Canadian Army to prepare
an attack for that afternoon. This was designed
either to pin the two remaining panzer divisions
to the Verrières Ridge sector or to take advantage
of what appeared to be a wide open road to
Falaise.46
By 1944 ULTRA had become the “defining
hand” in Allied intelligence. It was used to guide
planning and decision-making, and both Army
and Army Group commanders relied heavily
on what it had to offer.47 Although Montgomery,
Crerar and Simonds were aware of ULTRA to
varying degrees, security restrictions prohibited
revealing the source of this information to lower
levels of command. This meant that Foulkes,
Megill and others at or below that level had to
trust that higher command knew what was best.48
In addition, the security regulations surrounding
ULTRA made its utilization on the battlefield an
art in itself. Winterbotham, who was responsible
for the indoctrination of ULTRA users, made sure
to press home the point that no action based
solely on ULTRA could be taken which would
indicate to German High Command that their
most secret communications were compromised.
As a result, there was always a pressing need to
cover the source of the information and alleviate
any suspicions about signals security lurking
in the minds of the German High Command.
The general approach taken by Allied High

Command was to utilize reconnaissance flights,
patrols and battalion-level actions designed to
either obtain identifications of enemy units or
capture prisoners. These could then be used to
foster the illusion that any subsequent decisions
were generated by these efforts and not signals
intelligence.49
Despite its seemingly Delphic nature, there
was no guarantee that the intelligence provided by
ULTRA would be either exact, complete or more
importantly, interpreted correctly. As a result,
ULTRA proved to be a double-edged sword.
If the information gleaned was appreciated
correctly, and a “cost-efficient” victory ensued,
then confidence in the abilities of the ULTRAindoctrinated command or commander would
result. However, if an incorrect appreciation,
defeat or pyrrhic victory resulted, coupled with
the inability to explain to subordinates the
reasoning behind such an ULTRA-inspired or
dictated decision, acrimony and non-confidence
could ensue. This proved to be the case for
Foulkes, Megill, and Mitchell as Allied High
Command failed to draw the proper conclusions
from ULTRA.
Unknown to Foulkes, his appearance at
the front was prompted by a series of ULTRA
decrypts that arrived at First Canadian Army
Headquarters just before noon. These indicated
that a pull out by the 1st SS had begun during
the night.50 Although ULTRA revealed that a
staged withdrawal was indeed taking place, First
Canadian Army Intelligence was not convinced of
the currency of the ULTRA and suspected that
the withdrawal may have been completed by
midday. To confirm this supposition, Crerar’s
Headquaters contacted 2nd Canadian Corps
at 1330 hours and ordered their divisions to
“push their necks out.”51 Within 15 minutes,
Elliot Rodger (Chief of Staff at 2nd Canadian
Corps) contacted Foulkes who came to Mitchell’s
headquarters in person a short time later, and
expanded the scope and nature of the operations.52
Due to the strict security regulations, the reasons
behind this could not be disseminated to division,
brigade or battalion levels; thus when Foulkes
and Megill issued orders without putting Mitchell
into the complete picture, their conduct was
Opposite: This air photograph, taken on 16 July 1944,
shows the southern edge of St. Martin-de-Fontenay, the
“Chateau,” the “Factory” as well as May-sur-Orne.
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influenced by the fact that they too were ignorant
concerning the detailed motives underpinning the
operation. It is quite likely that Foulkes and Megill
were also similarly informed that the operation
was imperative so that a “larger plan could be
carried out.” Not only did they have to accept
this explanation, but in turn, had to issue orders
to their subordinates based on this ambiguous
rationale. As a result, the impression left with
Mitchell, particularly post facto, was that Foulkes
and Megill were simply funnelling orders from
high command. On the surface, this was indeed
correct; not due to any failings of their own, but
rather to the structural constraints of a highly
secret source of intelligence of which they were
unaware and to which all three were unwitting
servants. Should the advance on May-sur-Orne
have been a complete, or less-costly, success, it is
likely that this impression would not have taken
root with Mitchell. However, as the operation
concluded with heavy losses and what appeared
to be little or no tangible gain, the prima facie
reasons given did not hold water for the ULTRA
un-indoctrinated, leaving a misleading legacy of
professional ineptitude for over six decades.

10.
11.
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